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This article presents a simple approach that will allow decision-makers to evaluate the return on 
investment of software process improvement prior to launching such an effort. Obviously, it will 
be easy to tell ten years up the road whether the right decision was made. But a CEO, or CIO 
contemplating laying out six, or seven figures for the additional personnel and resources to 
conduct SPI is not in a position to make that call and the wise ones will not be led into it by blind 
faith. The problem is assessing the risks and returns of such a project in terms and perspective 
that a non-technical decision-maker can understand. We believe our instrument serves that 
purpose.  
 
1.0  Introduction: The Problem 
oftware busts schedules and budgets in a way that would not be tolerated in any other industry. It is a fact 
that…. Depending on project size, between 25% and 50% of all projects fail, where "failure" means that 
the project is canceled or grossly exceeds its schedule estimates (Laker, 1998). A recent Standish Group 
survey of 8,000 software projects found that the average exceeded its planned budget by 90 percent and its schedule 
by 120 percent (Construx, 1998). Several industry studies have reported that fewer than half of the software projects 
initiated in this country finish within their allotted schedules and budgets (Construx, 1998).  
This is not a new phenomenon. A study done by the GAO in the 1980s found that fully two-thirds of the 
software delivered to the federal government was never used and an additional 29% was never delivered at all. The 
good news was that 3% was usable after changes and 2% could be used as delivered. As a result, the GAO estimated 
that throughout the 1980s the federal Government's bill for worthless software topped $150 billion (Quoted in 
Humphrey, 1994). When 95% of the software delivered to the federal government is worthless you might expect 
some accountability. Yet numerous studies since then have documented the same problems. These include: 1) Poor 
project planning, 2) Inadequate documentation of project requirements, 3) Insufficient understanding of the 
business, 4) Lack of support and involvement from senior management, and 5) No written quality plan or no 
effective implementation of the plan (SEI, 1997). 
The Standish Group found that the most common causes of project failure were management-based 
considerations. That covered such things as incomplete requirements, lack of user involvement, lack of resources, 
unrealistic expectations, lack of executive support, and changing requirements. Those causes occurred with 
approximately equal frequency (Construx, 1998).  A similar study conducted by KPMG Pete Marwick found that 
87% of failed projects exceeded their initial schedule estimates by 30% or more. While at the same time 56% 
exceeded their budget estimates by 30% or more and 45% failed to produce expected benefits. This resulted 
primarily from the following causes (KPMG, 1997)  
 
____________________ 
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1. Project objectives not fully specified (51%)  
2. Bad planning and estimating (48%)  
3. Technology that is new to the organization (45%)  
4. Inadequate, or no project management methodology (42%)  
5. Insufficient experienced staff on the team (42%)  
6. Poor performance by suppliers of hardware/software (42%) 
 
It would be a cop out to suggest that these failures were a consequence of extreme project size, or 
complexity. In actuality 60% of these failed projects were categorized by KPMG as small. The fact is that small 
projects (e.g., those that are characteristic of the average mom-and-pop software shop) are almost always over 
schedule (92%). In fact the larger, more complex projects actually did better. KPMG found that only 86% of these 
had problems meeting their delivery dates (which is still a pathetic statistic). One reason cited for the success of the 
big projects was that formal project and risk management techniques were almost always employed in their 
management.  
Which leads to the inescapable conclusion that any organization, large or small, simple or complicated, 
functions better with some sort of defined management structure. The overall purpose of which is to insure that the 
organization's people equipment and financial resources are utilized efficiently. That requires understanding all of 
the purposes and intents of the business. The most telling result of the KPMG study was the impact of the general 
business environment on software project success. Between 44% and 48% of the reasons for project failure came as 
a consequence of the failure of the software people to clearly understand how the business operated. Exacerbating 
that problem was the third most common cause of failure, which was the lack of involvement and support from 
managers. Where projects failed the most common cause was a lack of project management (execution) and either a 
lack of skill, or an inability to monitor project activity on the part of the project manager (KPMG, 1998).  
 
2.0  Quality Management, Solution or Silver Bullet? 
 
In 1987 Watts Humphrey published an article about assessing software engineering capability (CMU/SEI-
87-TR-023, 1987). That was developed into the early Capability Maturity Model described in Characterizing the 
Software Process (Humphrey, 1988) and Managing the Software Process (Humphrey, 1989). Version 1.0 of the 
CMM was released in August of 1991 in two technical reports, Capability Maturity Model for Software (Paulk, 
1991), and Key Practices of the Capability Maturity Model (Weber 1991). This first version would quickly become 
the Capability Maturity Model (CMM 1.1), which was rolled out in 1993 by Mark Paulk and Bill Curtis (Paulk, 
1993). In the meantime, recognizing the limitations of ISO 9000 for software ISO was in the process of developing a 
much more powerful assessment based certification standard. This went under the informal name of SPICE 
throughout the 1990s and was formalized as the ISO TR 15504 Standard in May of 1998. The US has finished the 
second phase of the field trials for this standard and is expected to complete phase three trials in 2000. Promulgation 
of the ISO 15504 Standard is expected in 2001. 
 
All of these quality system standards concern themselves with the way an organization goes about its work 
not (directly at least) the outcomes of that work. In other words, they concern themselves with processes, not 
products under the assumption that if the production and management system is right the product or service that it 
produces will also be correct. In the case of all of these Standards, the philosophy is that the requirements are 
generic. Which means that no matter what the organization is or does, if it wants to establish a quality management 
system, the essential features are spelled out. These are contained in the must address clauses of ISO 9000 or in the 
key processes and common features of CMM and ISO 15504. It should be noted that quality management 
frameworks such as CMM, or ISO 9000 provide the organization with a template for setting up and running a 
quality system.  
 
In concept a quality management system that follows such a defined model, or "conforms to a standard", 
embodies these state-of-the-art practices. The end-result of this conformance is much improved organizational 
efficiency and effectiveness. These can be intangible as well as bottom line gains. Brodman (1995) reports on many 
non-measurable benefits from such practices. These include… “Improved morale by the developers increased 
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respect for software from organizations external to software and less required overtime” (quoted in DACS, 1999). 
Brodman notes that some organizations looked at benefits from SPI not just in financial terms, but in terms of being 
more competitive (cheaper and better), improved customer satisfaction (fewer post release problems in the software) 
and more repeat business from their customers (quoted in DACS, 1999). 
 
Since CMM was introduced a number of reports and papers have been circulated that discuss the costs and 
benefits of that model. Herbsleb (1994) provided statistical results as reported by 13 organizations to demonstrate 
the expected value of CMM-based Software Process Improvement. His findings were primarily focused on Level 2 
and Level 3 organizations. They show gains in productivity due to… “Better requirements elicitation, better 
software management, and incorporation of a software reuse program. Gains in early detection of defects and 
reductions in calendar time were primarily attributed to reuse… There was no apparent correlation between years 
of SPI and ROI” (DACS, 1999). The Boeing Space Transportation Systems (STS) Defense and Space Group reports 
that improved software processes now find nearly 100% of all defects. Although this increased the design effort by 
25% (4% of total development time), it reduced rework during testing by 31% (of total development time). So a 4% 
increase in effort returned a 31% reduction in rework resulting in a 7.75:1 ROI (Yamamura and Wigle, 1997). 
Raytheon characterized the benefit of their improvement program by differentiating their costs into the categories of 
doing it right the first time versus the cost of rework. Based on their process improvement program, Raytheon was 
able to report that it had eliminated $15.8 million in rework in less than 5 years (DACS, 1999).  
 
Reports of such glowing success for SPI are all well and good, however the problem with most of these 
studies is that they have been conducted in organizations that typically work much closer to the leading edge than 
the average IT firm. Therefore the results tend to be obscured by the fact that the projects on which they are based 
are not typical of common IT operation. What’s been missing to this point is a simple mechanism that will allow an 
everyday businessperson to assess the value of formal SPI in their day-to-day practice and that is the objective of the 
rest of this article.   
3.0  ROI as a Decision Factor in Software Process Improvement Projects 
 
This section introduces a technique for evaluating the return on investment in Software Process 
Improvement (SPI) by comparing its risks against all potential gains. Strassman (1990) believes that risk analysis is 
a very important aspect of appraisal. According to him, "Risk analysis is the correct analytical technique with which 
one can examine the uncertainty of Information Technology investments prior to implementation." He believes that 
"By making the risks of technology more explicit, you create a framework for diagnosing, understanding and 
containing the inherent difficulties associated technological and organizational innovation" (DACS, 1999).  
 
Curtis (1995) points out that it is difficult to measure cost benefits from process improvements in immature 
organizations because immature organizations rarely have good cost data (DACS, 1999). Since immature 
organizations are, by definition, the focus of this study, we felt that we had to devise an instrumentation that would 
take into account the fact that there would be very little quantitative data available to appraise initial value. Violino 
(1997) polled 100 IT managers to understand the importance of ROI calculations in IT investments. He found that, 
"intangible" ROI measures are required to assess a company's real sources of value. Consequently, our approach is 
built around an instrument that characterizes the gap between an organization’s current operational state and 
capability levels targeted in such common models as CMM and ISO 9000-3. The outcome is a single value for a 
complete set of risk factors that can then be compared against a like value for all of the anticipated returns. McGarry 
and Jeletic (1993) identified five factors that are required to determine the benefits of process improvement. In turn, 
we have embodied these within the framework of our assessment instrument: 
 
1. Set goals for what is to be improved,  
2. Establish a basic understanding of an organizations current process and product,  
3. Investment in change must be made,  
4. The effects of the change must be measured to determine if any improvement has been achieved, and  
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5. Measure the ROI by (a) determining what resources have been expended, b establishing what 
improvements, both qualitative and quantitative, have been achieved, and (c) determining the difference 
between the investment made and the benefits obtained 
 
Finally, Capers Jones (1996) has said that process maturity can be assessed based on the degree of 
planning, sizing, estimating, tracking, measurement infrastructure (development) and reuse activity that is present in 
the organization and he further ties company size to the range of per employee costs for SPI. He found that 
organizations typically moved through seven stages on their way to maturity and that depending on the size of the 
company improvement could take between 26 and 76 calendar months with a return on investment ranging from 
three-to-one, to thirty-to-one. He says that depending on the stage (the greatest gains coming at level five and 
above). SPI can result in a 90% reduction in software defects, a 350% productivity gain and a 70% schedule 
reduction (DACS, 1999). The cost of software process improvement at each of these stages can be uniformly 
characterized in terms of a common set of factors.  1) Estimated Cost to reach a given Stage, 2) Number of Months 
to reach a given Stage, 3) Estimated Number of Defects, 4) Productivity LOC/Day, 5) Schedule Length, 6) Overall 
Project Development Costs, and 7) Overall Project Maintenance Costs. The instrument incorporates the first five of 
these factors as risks (although they could also be treated as benefits). The final two are treated as benefits.  
 
The participants in this appraisal should be senior managers, since Lipke believes that the necessary 
ingredients for success in SPI are leadership by people at that level (reported in DACS, 1999). In their responses, 
designated decision-makers are asked to provide their appraisals of such business factors as percentage investment 
in SPI versus overall investment, degree of current operational performance as characterized by rework, criticality 
and degree of technical risk assessment. Respondents provide a numeric judgment in response to each question 
posed. Although the subsequent values are based on estimation the questions are interlocking. Therefore a complete 
scan is presumed to address every possible contingency of risk versus benefit.  
 
4.0  Evaluating the Risks and Returns of Process Improvement 
 
Given the prior discussion we believe that the instrument and approach that we have developed will 
successfully evaluate the risks and benefits of software process improvement. Its purpose is to evaluate a range of 
factors associated with SPI project strengths and weaknesses for risk and return issues. Table one shows how these 
individual risk and return factors are weighted and scored. The factors in this array are drawn from an OMB study of 
multiple best practice organizations. Higher scores are given to elements of excessive risk as well as excessive 
benefit, or those elements that exceed positive aspects of the decision criteria. Additionally, weights have been 
attached to criteria to reflect their relative importance in the decision process.  
 
 
TABLE 1: Assessment of Risks and Returns for SPI 
 
Overall Risk Factors: Need for SPI    
Factor One: Investment Size  Assigned Value (1 - 10) x   Weight 
= 
Criticality 
    
Estimate the percent of budgeted investment in SPI 
personnel  
1_______5_______10 10  
versus the total budgeted investment in personnel      Low %                   High %  
    
Estimate the average hourly rate paid to SPI staff versus  1_______5_______10 5  
average overall hourly rate of pay  Low Cost          High 
Cost 
  
    
Estimate percent of source lines of code (SLOC) that will be    1_______5_______10 10  
effected by SPI project in comparison to overall SLOC      Large                        
Small 
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Estimate the current Average Defect rate per thousand 1_______5_______10 10  
source lines of code (K)SLOC High                        
Low                             
  
    
Estimate the current Software Defect Removal  1_______5______10 5  
Efficiency Percentage High                         
Low 
 
    
TOTAL FOR THIS ASSURANCE FACTOR    
    
Factor Two: Project Management Process Maturity    
    
Is each project modular (e.g., each project element is  1_______5___ __10 3  
Individually planned and resourced)?  Modular          Non-Modular            
    
Is each project schedule based on defined and logically 1______5______10 2  
related milestones Consistently  Inconsistently  
    
Is each project scoped to fit available resources (including  1_______5______10 2  
staff capability) prior to commitment?  Consistently  Inconsistently  
    
Are project schedules consistently adhered to and the 1_______5______10 6  
milestone and deadline commitments consistently met? Consistently  Inconsistently  
    
Are project budget commitments consistently met? 1_______5______10 6  
 Consistently  Inconsistently  
    
Is software development controlled through use of validated  1_______5______10 5  
software engineering practices or other disciplined 
methods?  
 Disciplined           Ad-hoc                        
    
Are inspections consistently carried out for the purpose of 1_______5______10 3  
identifying problems as early as possible  Consistently  Inconsistently  
    
Are inspections consistently carried out for the purpose of 1_______5______10 3  
reducing rework  Consistently  Inconsistently  
    
TOTAL FOR THIS ASSURANCE FACTOR    
    
Factor Three: Degree of Technical Risk Assigned Value (1 - 10) x   Weight 
= 
Criticality 
    
Is the technology base and/or project base primarily 1_______5______10 6  
geared toward experimental or established technologies? Established   Experimental            
    
Is the systems architecture and software base technically  1_______5_____10 6  
complex, or routine operational  Routine             Complex                         
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Is there a disciplined management mechanism for 
integrating 
1______5_______10 5  
new technology and processes into the technology base?   Disciplined           Ad-hoc                        
    
Is there a disciplined mechanism for control of change 
within 
1_______5______10 5  
the technology base (AKA configuration management)?  Disciplined           Ad-hoc                        
    
Is there a disciplined mechanism for monitoring, measuring 1_______5______10 5  
and reporting activity within the technology base (AKA, 
SQA)? 
 Disciplined           Ad-hoc                        
    
Is the organization's technology base primarily composed of  1_______5______10 3  
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software?  COTS     Custom 
Software 
  
    
TOTAL FOR THIS ASSURANCE FACTOR    
    
OVERALL ASSURANCE SCORE    
    
Overall Return Factors    
Business Impact Assigned Value (1 - 10) x   Weight 
= 
Criticality 
    
Is the investment in SPI aimed at improving the 
performance 
1_______5_______10 10  
of a specific area of the organization? Specific                 
Overall 
  
    
Can the benefits of SPI be expressed in outcome 1_______5_______10 5  
oriented terms? No                          Yes   
    
Customer Needs - Assigned Value (1 - 10) x   Weight 
= 
Criticality 
    
Can the investment in SPI be referenced to identifiable 1______5_______10 10  
internal and/or external customer needs or demands Unrelated               
Related 
  
    
Have internal and/or external customers reported problems 1_______5_______10 10  
with quality and/or timeliness of delivered software product   No                         Yes   
    
Return on Investment Assigned Value (1 - 10) x   Weight 
= 
Criticality 
    
Are cost-benefit analyses performed before committing  1______5______10 3  
to each Project     Yes                     No   
    
Are technical needs, or considerations the primary driver for  1______5______10 2  
commitment decisions    No                   Yes   
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Are project commitment decisions reviewed and/or 
authorized  
1______5______10 2  
by managers above the technical level     Yes                     No   
    
Does the organization primarily obtain its software from 1______5______10 3  
acquisition rather than development     Yes                     No   
    
Are cost-benefit results reliable and technically sound 1_______5_______10 5  
 Solid                    Risky   
    
Can the investment in SPI be shown to result in a  1______5_______10 10  
reduction in costs? Unclear    Demonstrated   
    
Organizational Impact Assigned Value (1 - 10) x   Weight 
= 
Criticality 
    
Does the SPI Project affect a large part of the organization 1_______5_______10 15  
(i.e., a large number of users, work processes, and 
systems)? 
Low Impact    High 
Impact 
  
    
Improvement Context Assigned Value (1 - 10) x   Weight 
= 
Criticality 
    
Is the SPI effort intended to support, or enhance an 
existing  
1_______5_______10 5  
operation or is it intended to improve future capability Tactical            Strategic   
    
Is the SPI effort necessary to meet the requirements of 1_______5_______10 10  
a contract or other externally mandated requirement  Internal              
External 
  
    
Is the SPI project required to maintain the organization's 1_______5_______10 5  
critical functioning Not Critical              Critical  
    
Is the SPI project expected to produce a high level 1_______5_______10 5  
of improvement Low Level       High Level   
    
OVERALL RETURN SCORE    
    
    
RETURN ON INVESTMENT     
(the RETURN SCORE minus the ASSURANCE SCORE)    
 
 
The respondent provides a one-to-ten numeric response for each question. When that is arrived at this value 
is multiplied by the weight assigned to it and the calculated total is placed in the boxes provided opposite the 
question. Once each section is completed, the values that have been calculated and placed in each individual box are 
summed and entered in the box next to “Total for this Factor”.  These factor scores are summed to obtain a total 
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section score. Once a score is obtained for both the Risk and the Return sections the Overall Risk Factor score is 
subtracted from the Overall Return Factor score to arrive at a ROI value estimate. Then: 
 
 If that number is positive there is likelihood that you will get a positive return on investment from a 
Software Process Improvement Project. 
 If that number is negative there is likelihood that the investment in an SPI program will not generate a 
worthwhile return. 
 If the value obtained is greater than 100 (e.g., a 10% difference in either direction) than it is strongly 
recommended that the result be considered indicative for the purpose of decision-making. 
 
As noted earlier, although the assigned values are based on estimation the questions are interlocking. 
Therefore a complete scan of an operation is presumed to address every possible contingency of risk versus benefit.  
 
5.0  Instrument Validation 
 
In order to assess this instrument’s reliability, we asked representatives of three different organizations (one 
car company, one first tier supplier and a defense contractor) to fill it out. We were looking to confirm two factors: 
inter-rater reliability and the predictive power of the instrument. The first factor was investigated by way of a 
correlation of the responses of decision-makers from the same unit in three different corporations.  Essentially we 
asked IT employees at similar levels and in similar places to rate their company based on the instrument. This rating 
was collected blind (e.g., the raters did not communicate with each other during the rating process) and 
simultaneously. Table Two presents the results: 
 
 
TABLE 2: Inter-rater Responses 
 
Supplier One  Rater 1 Rater 2   Rater 3 Rater 4   Rater 5 Rater 6 
Investment Size 178 211  180 175  270 166 
Process Maturity 210 235  244 239  250 230 
Technical Risk 170 223  168 190  173 160 
Business Impact 150 150  87 110  118 90 
Customer Needs 186 171  147 212  122 99 
Cost-Benefit 152 126  110 144  127 87 
Organizational Impact 100 95  139 104  167 77 
Improvement Context 205 199  187 168  212 164 
Correlation  0.852   0.776   0.825 
         
Defense Two Rater 1 Rater 2   Rater 1 Rater 2   Rater 1 Rater 2 
Investment Size 200 222  111 166  220 265 
Process Maturity 250 201  187 202  199 254 
Technical Risk 268 220  118 170  97 222 
Business Impact 150 150  87 117  84 114 
Customer Needs 200 170  134 212  120 155 
Cost-Benefit 171 144  90 126  77 125 
Organizational Impact 115 87  77 122  54 99 
Improvement Context 187 196  101 187  185 132 
Correlation  0.853   0.786   0.721 
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Car Company Three  Rater 1 Rater 2   Rater 1 Rater 2   Rater 1 Rater 2 
Investment Size 109 210  163 184  263 228 
Process Maturity 158 235  145 222  120 164 
Technical Risk 172 240  157 170  137 190 
Business Impact 110 161  130 110  123 97 
Customer Needs 188 173  145 200  221 183 
Cost-Benefit 122 142  113 130  227 187 
Organizational Impact 90 115  89 100  45 66 
Improvement Context 126 127  155 165  137 204 
Correlation  0.576   0.742   0.776 
 
 
As can be seen with a couple of exceptions there is a surprisingly high degree of relationship between 
raters. Because these values were so high we actually followed up with each of our raters to double check the 
application of our protocol. All of the raters felt that the results correctly reflected their perception of their unit’s 
situation and none of the raters was aware of how the other person in their unit had scored the instrument (although 
several expressed no surprise that the results were so similar).  
 
The second, and perhaps more interesting aspect of this study was the attempt to validate the predictive 
power of the instrument. The ratings listed above were compared to the known level of process maturity of the 
corporations for which they were prepared. The first corporation is ISO 9000 certified. The second corporation has 
been consistently assessed at CMM level three. While the IS&S area in the third company is a classic CMM level 
one chaos operation. Looking at the scores obtained during our validation study we found that there was 
considerable variance in the assessed need for formal process improvement (based on our scoring system) among 
these three. Table Three outlines this: 
 
 
TABLE 3: Comparison of Ratings 
 
 Average Risk Average Return Average Difference 
Supplier One 612 701 89 
Defense Two 595 661 66 
Car Company Three 545 697 152 
 
 
As can be seen, the company that is arguably in the position to benefit the most from a formal SPI process 
is also the one that has the highest rating for return on that investment (15.2%). Whereas, the score for the company 
that we call Defense Two (which is already at level three CMM) actually seems to indicate that additional 
expenditure for formal SPI in this company would probably not produce a sufficient enhancement of the current 
operation to justify the investment (6.6%).  
 
We were particularly interested in the score for Supplier One. It is one of the small set of IT operations in 
our area that is fully ISO 9001 certified and the relatively low differential score appears to reflect this. Furthermore 
given the general belief that there is a reasonable degree of correspondence between an ISO 9000 operation and 
CMM level two, this also tended to substantiate our notion that this instrument is correctly responding to variations 
in process maturity. 
 
The important fact from the perspective of this article however, is the evidence that the questionnaire 
appears to be internally consistent as well as predictive. This first study was not rigorous enough to be claimed as 
scientific, so we are not peddling these results as conclusive. However the consistently reasonable correlation 
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between raters as well as the apparent ability to differentiate companies based on their known levels of process 
maturity is encouraging to the authors. 
 
6.0  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This article has presented a simple mechanism and approach that will allow decision-makers to evaluate the 
return on investment of SPI prior to launching such an effort. Why is this potentially useful? First and foremost it is 
worthwhile because the attitudes in the IT community toward software process improvement generally approach 
religious zeal. That is, people either believe in it, or they don’t. But there has never been a lot of “thinking through” 
of how, or whether, an organization arrived at their given doctrine. This is dangerous for a lot of reasons, the most 
obvious and practical one merely being the question of whether the organization will then spend its precious 
resources wisely. 
 
That question should keep decision-makers up at nights because SPI costs money and in some cases that 
expense can be significant. Obviously, it will be easy to tell ten years up the road whether the right decision was 
made. But a CEO, or CIO contemplating laying out six, or seven figures for the additional personnel and resources 
to conduct SPI is not in a position to make that call and the wise ones will not be led into it by blind faith. Which 
implies the need for some sort of reliable crystal ball.  
 
Our bias in the beginning was that any expenditure in formal SPI is money well spent. However, our own 
short validation study encouraged us to temper that enthusiasm with a little realism. Oddly enough this new caution 
was also substantiated by some early studies done at the Software Engineering Institute (reported in SEI, 1989). 
These tended to indicate that the gap between the most effective IT organizations and the ones that were the least 
capable was remarkably wide. The problem was sorting out which was which and putting their relative position into 
some sort of perspective that a non-technical decision-maker could understand. We believe our instrument serves 
that purpose. It appears in the first cut to successfully identify organizations in need of initial SPI and it also appears 
to identify those where such an effort is not worth the cost. We will continue our validation studies, but if this ability 
to discriminate holds up we believe that this could be a valuable tool for organizations trying to invest wisely in the 
IT marketplace.   
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